Crisis of Majority Representative Democracy or a Transition to Judicial Democracy

Abstract

Objective: To analyze the crisis of majority representative democracy and the growing centrality of the Judiciary in the contemporary democratic process, investigating the limits of judicial activism and judicialization in redefining the balance among state powers.

Method: This study adopts a qualitative approach based on bibliographic review and analysis of precedents from national and foreign constitutional courts. Classical and contemporary theoretical frameworks of democratic theory and constitutionalism were examined, as well as landmark judicial decisions related to judicial activism, judicialization of politics, and the protection of fundamental rights.

Results: The findings indicate that the Judiciary’s protagonism has simultaneously contributed to strengthening substantive democracy through the expansion of rights and the protection of minorities and to weakening representative democracy by shifting decision-making centrality from Parliament to courts. Judicial activism reveals an ambivalent character, functioning both as an instrument of democratic stabilization and as a factor of deficit of popular legitimacy and risk of abusive judicialism.

Conclusion: It is concluded that consolidating a balanced democratic model requires the establishment of normative and institutional parameters for judicial action in order to preserve the separation of powers, popular participation, and the principle of democratic legitimacy. The analysis shows that the transition toward judicial democracy, without adequate limits, tends to undermine the foundations of representative democracy.